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The use of hospital records as evidence is becoming more wide-
spread because of the increasing volume of personal injury cases being
filed, and also because of the many types of cases involving hospital
treatment. With their increased use, increased problems arise con-
cerning their admissibility and use in the preparation and trial of a
case.
Upon the adoption in Ohio of the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act,1 hospital records became admissible as "business rec-
ords." The Act specifically states:
As used in this section "business" includes every kind of
business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institu-
tions, whether carried on for profit or not.
In Weis v. Weis,' the leading Ohio case on the subject, the court
said:
Under this and similar statutes, by the great weight of author-
ity, those portions of hospital records made in the regular course of
business and pertaining to the business of hospitalization and re-
cording observable acts, transactions, occurrences or events incident
to the treatment of a patient are admissible, in the absence of
privilege, as evidence of the facts therein recorded, insofar as such
records are helpful to an understanding of the medical or surgical
aspects of the case, and insofar as relevant to the issues involved,
provided such records have been prepared, identified and authenti-
cated in the manner specified in the statute itself.
When a case arises, from the plaintiff's standpoint, one of the
first steps for counsel is to see his client's hospital record, either by
going in person to the hospital and reading it or, preferably, by re-
questing a photostatic copy from the hospital. With extremely few
exceptions, counsel can usually obtain a photostatic copy of the client's
hospital record by requesting it in writing, enclosing with the request
a written authorization signed by the client, authorizing the hospital
to release the information to the attorney, and an offer to pay the
charge for photostating.
From the defendant's standpoint, the hospital will not release
the information contained in a patient's record without the written
consent of the patient. In today's practice, and especially in settle-
ment negotiations conducted with insurance adjusters before suit, the
* Member of the Ohio and Cleveland Bar.
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.40 (1953).
2 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
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claimant's attorney, after first inspecting the records himself to be sure
no damaging admissions by the patient have found their way into the
record, and also after assuring himself that the history, as given by
the patient, has been correctly recorded, will exhibit or even furnish
the copy to the adjuster to convince him or prove to him and his com-
pany that the claimant received the injuries for which the claim is
made. As has been said: If the insurance company is expected to buy
a package it is certainly entitled to see what it is buying.
It is safe to say that a high percentage of claims are settled in
this manner and never reach the courts, thus saving the time of the
courts, expense to the taxpayers and, of equal importance, the time,
energy and expenses of preparation and trial by the claimant's counsel.
When the trial date has been set, usually the plaintiff, but often
the defendant, will issue a subpoena to the hospital to produce the
records which should be sent to the courtroom in the possession of the
hospital's record librarian. If the plaintiff calls the record librarian
to the stand and, after proper identification, offers the record in evi-
dence, any privilege attaching thereto is automatically waived and it
only remains for the court, if objection is made by defense counsel,
to determine which portion of the record, if not all, is admissible.
Self-serving statements and conclusions will be ruled out and if
such statements or conclusions are contained on a separate page that
can be taken out and handed back to the librarian without mutilating
the record or eliminating relevant and admissible matter, this is usually
done. If this cannot be accomplished in that manner, then the court
and counsel for both sides usually collaborate to conceive some method
of covering the objectionable portion so that it cannot be seen by the
jury and the record is then admitted into evidence.
At this point, some plaintiffs' attorneys will excuse the record
librarian and read excerpts from the record themselves, or sometimes
lay the record aside for later reference, and frequently save it to be
used during the examination of the physician, if the physician who
attended the patient in the hospital is to be called.
However, from the plaintiff's standpoint, it has been found to be
very effective, once the hospital records have been received in evi-
dence, to have the record librarian read the entire record to the jury,
nurse's notes, medication orders, laboratory reports, etc. In the first
place, the librarian is accustomed to reading the handwriting of the
physicians, which at times is not too legible. She is also familiar with
the signs and symbols used and can tell the jury what they mean. But
secondly, and more important, she is employed by the hospital, is the
hospital's official representative in the courtroom and the average jilror
is more impressed by hearing the contents of the record from the lips
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of the official representative of the hospital, than by hearing it read by
the plaintiff's attorney, who may or may not be able to decipher it.
The most controversial issue in connection with hospital records
is the matter of privilege. To what extent are the contents of a person's
hospital record privileged? As has been stated, if plaintiff himself
offers the record, the privilege is waived. But, there are many instances
when the defendant seeks to gain access to the plaintiff's hospital
record, either by deposition before trial, or introducing it in evidence
at the trial, when plaintiff has, for some valid reason, not offered the
record.
In such cases, the important question arises as to what portions
of the hospital record are privileged and what portions are not.
The Ohio Revised Code provides:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:(A) An attorney, concerning a communication made to him
by his client in that relation or his advice to his client; or a
physician, concerning a communication made to him by his patient
in that relation, or his advice to his patient. (Emphasis added.) 3
The Business Records Act4 is broadly worded so as to include
hospital records as "business records." When this section is inter-
preted in the light of section 2317.02, above, the confusion then arises.
Section 2317.02 simply states that a physician may not testify
.. .concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that
relation or his advice to his patient."
What is a "communication" made to a physician by a patient?
The first impulse would be to turn to the dictionary for a definition of
the word "communication." However, since our courts have the last
word as to the meaning or "interpretation" of a word, as it is used in
a statute, we will turn to the courts.
In Ausdenmoore, Ex'r v. Holzback,5 the Ohio Supreme Court
said:
We hold that a communication by the patient to the physician
may be not only by word of mouth but also by exhibiting the body
or any part thereof to the physician for his opinion, examination
or diagnosis, and that that sort of communication is quite as clearly
within the statutes as a communication by word of mouth.
In Baker v. Industrial Comm'n,6 the court there said:
Privileged communications between patient and physician
may be either (1) by exhibition of the body to a physician for
examination or treatment, or (2) oral or written communications
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (1953).
4 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.40 (1953).
5 89 Ohio St. 341 (1914).
6 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 593 (1939).
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between patient and physician. For manifest reasons the statute
protects the patient in respect to both kinds. What the physician
learns by exhibition of the body of the patient is sealed to the
public and may not be testified to by the physician unless the
patient has given express consent or has voluntarily testified on
that subject.7
When is a communication by a patient considered as being a
communication to a physician? If a patient goes to a physician's
office, is seen personally by the physician and the physician takes the
history and complaints, it is, without a doubt, a communication to a
physician under the protection of section 2317.02. But, if the physician
is busy, or out of his office and his nurse, secretary or office girl takes
the history and complaints for him, writes it down and hands it to the
physician, is this a communication made to a physician by a patient?8
If the physician sends the patient to a hospital and upon admission
a nurse, employed by the hospital takes the patient's history and com-
plaints, and incorporates them into the hospital record, is this a "com-
munication made to a physician by his patient?" 9
If the physician, after placing the patient in the hospital, feels
that the patient is so seriously ill that he needs a private nurse and
engages one, are transactions between that nurse and the patient "com-
munications made to a physician by his patient?"" On the other hand,
if the patient's illness is not serious enough for, or the patient cannot
afford to have, a private nurse and the regular hospital nurses are
used, are transactions between the patient and the hospital nurses
"communications made to a physician by his patient?""
In all cases the nurses are under the direction and follow the
orders of the physician. Instead of the physician being present around
the clock and administering to the patient and observing the patient's
progress or reaction, the nurses do this for him, record the results and
activities on the hospital chart and give it to the physician for study.
The nurses are subject to the physician's orders and are, in effect, his
agents. In the instance where the physician issues orders to the private
nurse, the courts recognize her as the agent of the physician. In the
other case, the hospital furnishes the nurses and the courts do not
recognize them but in the end the patient, directly or indirectly, pays
for both. Both perform the same service, both have the same obliga-
tion to the physician and both have the same obligation to the patient.
Why, then, is a communication with one privileged but not with the
7 See also, In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 159 N.E.2d 334 (1958).
8 Humble v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 28 Ohio NYF. (ns.) 481 (C.P. 1931).
9 Weis v. Weis, supra note 2.
10 Humble v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., supra note 8.
11 Weis v. Weis, supra note 2.
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other? Carrying it one step further, if a patient becomes suddenly ill
and goes immediately to a hospital for treatment, without first seeing
his private physician, and is accepted by the hospital (an intangible
being) and treated by a physician employed by, and within the hos-
pital and attended by nurses employed by the hospital to serve the
physicians, then who is the patient's physician? Are the nurses the
agents of the physicians? Does the patient lose and forfeit the benefit
of privilege by entering the hospital and giving his history, etc. to a
nurse?
Today there is a general tendency to resort to hospitals in cases
which require surgical operations, or in cases of severe illness.' 2
The purpose of privilege is to protect one in need of medical
aid against the disclosure and consequent publicity of his body
ailments and to lend a sense of security and confidence to the
relation so that a patient will not be reticent about disclosures that
might be material to his physical welfare.) 3
The reason and purpose of privilege is thus stated very clearly
and very broadly. Yet when it comes to the application of the statute
the courts, in effect, draw a line between medical aid rendered by a
physician, personally, and that rendered by his subordinates and as-
sistants in a hospital, such as nurses, technicians, laboratory aides and
the like. Yet, all of those are there specifically for the purpose of aiding
the physician in his treatment and cure of the ill, and without which
he, in some cases, could accomplish nothing. Is there logic and fairness
to a rule that seals the lips of the operating surgeon, in order to protect
the patient, yet which allows the nurses in attendance at the operation,
to speak freely concerning the operation?
There seems to be a definite tendency on the part of the courts to
look upon and speak of a hospital as a recognized entity, itself per-
forming services, treating the sick and injured, rather than viewing it
for what it is; a place where patients are housed and specialized equip-
ment and a trained staff is maintained to assist the physicians in treat-
ment of the sick and injured. A hospital cannot practice medicine.
De Witt has stated:
Generally speaking, staff physicians and other physicians in
the employe of a hospital, public or private, enter into the rela-
tionship of physician and patient with every person who enters the
hospital for the purpose of care and treatment. The principle
applies as fully and effectually to a sick or injured person who is
brought to a hospital unconscious, or in a helpless state mentally,
as it does to one who enters of his own volition. Under and by
virtue of their appointment, contract, or whatever arrangement
12 Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 139 N.E. 287 (1922).
13 In re Loewenthal, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N.E.2d 158 (1956).
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they may have made with the hospital, every physician serving it
becomes the physician of each and every patient and they have no
legal or moral right or authority to view, treat or operate upon any
patient therein, except by virtue of that appointment or contract.
It is a matter of common knowledge that a hospital patient
may be examined or cared for at times by medical men whom he
has never seen and may never see again, submitting to their pro-
fessional services in the confident belief that they are his physicians
and that their examinations or ministrations are for the purpose
of enabling them to properly prescribe for or treat his malady or
injury. It is altogether right and proper, therefore, that the princi-
ples of medical ethics and the rule of privilege, applicable to the
individual physician selected by the patient, should apply with
equal force and effect to the group of physicians selected and em-
ployed by the hospital of which the sick or injured person is a
patient. Accordingly, it may be regarded as a general rule that a
patient, unless fully and frankly informed to the contrary, has
a perfect right to assume, and to rely upon the assumption, that
any physician who enters his ward or room is rightfully there and
has authority to act in his behalf and to examine his person or
question him concerning his disease or injury; and the physician
will not afterwards be heard to say that he was not connected with
the hospital and had no authority to examine or interrogate him.
The moment he undertakes to consult with or examine the hos-
pital's patient, the relationship of physician and patient exists, and
whatever confidential information the physician may have so
acquired is privileged and may not be disclosed in court without
the consent of the holder of the privilege. 14
The above statement is well documented by citations from numer-
ous states, although no Ohio decisions have been found. In the light of
the existing holdings of the Ohio courts upon the general subject of
patient-physician privilege it is reasonable to assume that up to this
point the Ohio courts would concur.
But there remains a serious and vital leak in the protective armor
of patient-physician privilege and that concerns the relationship of
patient and nurse.
The Ohio courts are committed to the doctrine that section
2317.02,'r making communications between certain persons privileged,
being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed and
since the relationship of nurse and patient was not named in the statute,
no privilege is extended to communications between a patient and his
nurse.
But is section 2317.02 of the Revised Code of Ohio to be strictly
construed? Section 2317.03,16 bearing the unofficial heading "Cases in
14 De Witt, Privileged Communications § 40 (1958).
15 Supra note 3.
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.03 (1953).
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which a party shall not testify," provides, and concludes, with the
following words:
* * * When a case is plainly within the reason and spirit of this
section and sections 2317.01 and 2317.02 of the Revised Code,
though not within the strict letter, their principles shall be applied.(Emphasis added.)
What did the Ohio General Assembly mean or intend when it
said:
When a case is plainly within the reason and spirit of this
section and sections 2317.01 and 2317.02 of the Revised Code
though not within the strict letter their principles shall be applied?
In Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, Admx.,17 the Ohio Supreme
Court in speaking of the provisions of these statutes said:
These various disqualifying provisions were treated as excep-
tions as to the statute removing the disqualification and conse-
quently were strictly construed. In 1880 these provisions of the
code appear as Sections 5240, 5241, 5242, Revised Statutes, and it
was provided in Section 5242 that "when a case is plainly within
the law and spirit of the last three sections, though not within the
strict letter, their principles shall be applied." It will be observed
that the law is not that the exceptions are to be multiplied byjudicial construction, but that the principles of the three sections
shall be applied when a case, not within the letter, is plainly within
their reason and spirit.
In Powell v. Powell,18 the Ohio Supreme Court said:
We have found it difficult sometimes to enforce this clause,
because of its very indefinite character.
In Cochran v. Almack,'9 the court said:
What is the scope of the clause under consideration it would
be difficult to say in advance of cases as they may arise. It calls
for the application of the principles of the three preceding sections,
only when the case is not provided for by either of these sections.
If the case is not within the letter but is plainly within the reason
or spirit of these sections their principles shall be applied.
Considering then the question of nurse-patient relationship, or
more broadly, the relationship between any or all hospital employees
or attendants and the patient, it is clear that nurses and others are not
specifically named or included within the "letter" of the law, but do
they not come within the "reason and spirit of law?" To begin with,
the patient resorts to the hospital for medical treatment. In order to
17 75 Ohio St. 270, 79 N.E. 478 (1906).
18 78 Ohio St. 331, 339 (1908).
19 39 Ohio St. 314, 316 (1883).
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have a full understanding of his ailment and to adequately treat him,
he must give a complete history and make full disclosure of his ail-
ments.
A hospital is defined as a place where sick and injured are cared
for. By law, individuals may bind themselves together into a legal
entity for the operation of a hospital, or the "place." But in this "place"
there must be physicians to actually treat the sick and injured. The
physicians must have nurses, technicians and many others in the
modern day organization to assist them in carrying out the objectives
of the hospital, to-wit: the treatment of the sick and injured.
Consequently, there is no difference in principle between the two
examples-one, where the patient goes to the physician's office and is
there treated for a minor ailment, with the help of the nurse employed
by the physician and second, where the physician sends the patient to
a hospital where he can have greater and more adequate facilities for
treating his patient and where the patient will be under constant ob-
servation by nurses, internes and the like. In both instances, the
physician is in charge of the patient; the patient has placed himself
in the hands of his physician and looks to him for advice and treat-
ment. In the first instance, the patient is fully protected on the ques-
tion of privilege but in the second instance, he loses an important part
of it with regard to the nurses, technicians and all attendants who are
not actually licensed physicians. Why? Is it not within the reason and
spirit of the law that persons offering themselves for medical treat-
ment, whether in a doctor's office or in a hospital, shall be secure in
the knowledge that all communications by them to their medical at-
tendants, be they nurse or physician, and any advice given or observa-
tions made or recorded in the course of, or in connection with their
treatment shall be privileged?
A hospital is an institution for the care of the sick and infirm.
Hospital care is the care of the sick and infirm in a hospital....
The services included in reasonably adequate hospital care are de-
termined by the state of contemporary medical science, by standards
prevailing in the practice of the art of medicine, by nursing stand-
ards established by law or local custom, and by legally defined or
generally accepted requirements for the safety, protection, and
comfort of the sick in hospitals or for the satisfaction of their
essential needs. ...
The essence of medical practice is diagnosis and treatment.
Hospital care divorced from diagnosis and treatment is incon-
ceivable, but no institution can "diagnose, treat, operate, or pre-
scribe." Making a diagnosis or ordering or administering treatment
is a personal act. Medicine is practiced "in" a hospital, never "by"
a hospital. When the courts say that a public or charitable hospital
may practice medicine because it is expressly organized for that
purpose, they can only mean that such hospitals, to the extent
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authorized by law, may employ or appoint physicians to treat the
sick. The hospital employs or appoints the physician; the
physician diagnoses, prescribes, or operates ...
The theory that an institution can take the place of a thinking
and acting human being is presumably based on the legal fiction
that a corporation is a person ...
A hospital, required to give adequate care, must arrange for
medical service, and it can only do so with the cooperation of
medical practitioners. . . . Medical organizations and local govern-
ment authorities, undertaking to define minimum standards of a
safe and acceptable hospital, demand that hospitals furnish or
arrange for competent auxiliary professional services. Typical re-
quirements include resident physicians, qualified laboratory diag-
nosticians, and certain categories of therapeutic specialists.
Under circumstances and conditions determined by medical
men, tests are made by laboratory experts and nurses who report
their findings to the clinician, the responsible practitioner in
charge of the case; the physician then makes the diagnoses.
How many physicians actually participate in the hospital
care of a single patient? Examination of a series of clinical his-
tories in a well conducted hospital revealed that in some cases as
many as twelve or fifteen separate medical functions were in some
cases performed in the process of diagnosis alone; the number of
required services is further increased by therapeutic indications.
Services of a medical nature required in hospital practice may be
supplied directly and exclusively by physicians; others of fact-
finding character with clinical bearing may be furnished by non-
medical personnel, who in turn are supervised by physicians.
Some of the required services are grave and time consuming, some
are slight and brief of duration, but all reflect the demands of
medical practitioners and are presumed to be indispensable to
effective practice. (Emphasis supplied.) 20
However, the Board of Trustees, the Administrator and the
medical staff, and all others in the hospital whose relationships
must be considered in the scheme of organization, have a primary
obligation to the patient which must be dominant in all their
activities and must serve as the touchstone for the entire plan of
hospital organization. . . . The patient is the individual on whom
all service is focused. He is the social entity without whom the
three groups would have no reason for existence.2 '
The courts seem to have difficulty with names and terms and
since the word "nurse" is not mentioned in the statute, the courts hold
that they are without power to broaden the statute to include nurses.
Of course, the courts are without authority to broaden the statute to
include contractors, accountants or grocers. But nurses are in every
instance directed by physicians, assist physicians, and are in effect
"the physicians' good right arm." The nursing profession came into
20 12 Hospitals 11-16 (July, 1938).
21 Bluestone, 36 Mod. Hosp. 83-86 (June, 1931).
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being for that very purpose and they are required, by law, to have
special training and to be licensed for that specific purpose, yet pro-
hibited by law from actually treating the sick. Nurses, then, may be
said to depend wholly upon physicians and, to a major extent, espe-
cially in hospitals, physicians are dependent upon nurses. How, then,
can the two be separated as it affects the patient's privilege and extend
it to the one and not to the other?
When a patient goes voluntarily to a hospital for treatment, or is
taken there by ambulance after an accident, he does not engage any
specific physician, nor does he (only in exceptional cases) engage a
private nurse. The facilities of the hospital are at his service and the
cost of the nurses, technicians, etc., is included in his bill as part of
his medical treatment.
To extend the "privilege" to physicians and to all those who assist
in the treatment of the patient would not be usurping the function of
the legislature by writing something into the law but rather would be
applying the law to cases "plainly within the reason and spirit of the
law... though not within the strict letter." (Emphasis added.)2 2
Insofar as it pertains to this discussion, Weis v. Weis 3 holds:
3. Hospital records, in the absence of privilege, are admissible
in evidence, insofar as there is compliance with the requirements
and conditions imposed by Section 21202-23, General Code [Uni-
form Business Records and Evidence Act] . . . and
4. Section 11494, General Code24 making privileged communi-
cations between certain persons, being in derogation of the com-
mon law, must be strictly construed, and consequently such section
affords protection only to those relationships which are specifically
named therein. The relationship of nurse and patient not being
named in the statute, no privilege is extended to communications
between a patient and his nurse and
5. Where hospital records include communications between
the patient and his physician, such portions of the records are,
in the absence of waiver of privilege, inadmissible in evidence by
virtue of the express provisions of Section 1149425 General Code.
In Humble v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.," a private nurse em-
ployed by a physician was prohibited from testifying on the grounds
that her testimony, like that of the physician by whom she was em-
ployed, was privileged. The court in the opinion said:
The nurse in question in this case was the private nurse of
Dr. Gilfillen and the only thing that she knew with reference to
22 Supra note 16.
23 Supra note 2.
24 Supra note 3.
25 Ibid.
26 3 Ohio Supp. 373 (1931), aff'd 31 N.E.2d 887 (1932), motion to cert. den. 32
NE.2d 425 (1932).
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the condition of the deceased was what she learned as an assistant
of the doctor through communications between the patient and the
physician or diagnosis and treatment of the physician. She had no
independent knowledge about the deceased's condition and as such
we think her lips were sealed by the statute. Gen. Code Sec.
11494.27
This case is one of first impression in this state upon this
point. The statute, itself, does not grant any privilege to com-
munications between the nurse and patient and it was so held in
the Wills case, supra.2 8 The relation in that case, however, was the
independent relation of a public health nurse and patient and
clearly not the same question as is involved here.
The court in the Humble case then quoted from the opinion in
the case of Culver v. Union Pac. R.R.,9 and concluded by saying:
We consider the Nebraska case to be the better reasoned opin-
ion. Most modern doctors are assisted in their office by nurses, a
practice which should be encouraged rather than discouraged, and
the nurse becomes the agent of the physician. If the privilege
granted by the statute is to be effective, it must extend to the nurse
in her capacity as an assistant to the physician so that she can not
disclose what she learns in such capacity when the physician, him-
self, cannot disclose it.
In the Culver case the superintendent of nurses at a hospital was
called as a witness but her testimony was excluded. The court there
said:
At the time the Nebraska statute was enacted the profession
of graduate or registered nurse had scarcely come into being.
Observing that the reasons which caused the extension of the
privilege to physicians applied with equal force to professional
nurses, New York and Arkansas have amended their statutes so as
to include "a professional or registered nurse." But the legislature
of Nebraska has not included such persons within the privileged
class, and a nurse, merely as such, is not within such class. A differ-
ent rule prevails where the nurse acts as one of the agents or
assistants of the physician in charge. A nurse is often necessarily
present at conversations between the patient and the doctor with
respect to the ailment or condition of a patient, and little good
would be subserved if the lips of the doctor might be sealed by the
statute as to such conversations but the nurse or attendant might
freely testify to all that was said and everything that was done.
The purpose of the law is to protect the right of privacy, and while
its scope should not be unduly extended, its very intention might
be completely thwarted by the admission of testimony from this
class of witness [hospital nurse]. In such case if she received or
heard confidential communications from a patient "necessary and
27 Supra note 3.
28 Wills v. National Life & Acc. Co., 28 Ohio App. 497, 162 N.E. 822 (1928).
29 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924).
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proper to enable him [the physician] to discharge the functions of
his office according to the usual course of practice," then the
privilege extended to the physician extends equally to the nurse 30
The Ohio Supreme Court recognizes that the attendants, nurses
and physicians collaborate to make the hospital record of a patient.3 1
Yet if this is done in the physician's office the records so made are
privileged but if the doctor moves the patient to the hospital, auto-
matically the nurse's notes and acts of other attendants lose their
status and are not privileged.
The nurse's notes are a most important part of a hospital chart.
They are compiled by the nurses specifically for the physicians' in-
formation and guidance in treating the patient.
Hospital charts of the patients are the records of the attending
physician: the information is acquired by the physician in a confi-
dential capacity. There is as good reason that the contents of the
hospital chart be kept free from curious and prying eyes as there
is that the physician be compelled to keep the same information a
secret.
32
It will be remembered that this same section of the Ohio code,-
dealing with the privilege between physician and patient, also provides
for privilege as to "an attorney concerning a communication made to
him by his client in that relation, or his advice to his client."
The Ohio courts hold that in connection with attorney-client
privilege, where information is obtained in preparation for trial it is
privileged.3
It is quite apparent that persons assisting an attorney in gather-
ing information and preparation for trial are not named in the statute
yet the privilege has been extended by the Ohio courts to cover them.
If the statute is extended, or "interpreted" to cover persons assisting
an attorney in preparation for trial, why can it not be extended, or
"interpreted" to cover persons assisting a physician in preparation for
medical treatment? If the court possesses the latitude to extend the
statute in the one instance, surely it must and does possess the same
latitude in the other instance.
The Ohio Supreme Court has officially stated that in connection
with the attorney-client relationship it extended the privilege to an
instance beyond those named in the statute and the decision stands
today as the law of this State.
30 Id. at 450, 199 N.W. at 797.
31 Weis v. Weis, supra note 2.
32 Hayt, "The Hospital in Modern Society," Bachman, Legal Aspects of Hospital
Practices 131 (1958).
33 Supra note 24.
34 In re Bates, 167 Ohio St. 46, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957).
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In the case of In re Story,35 after relating that the Ohio Supreme
Court had held that where records were compiled and turned over to
attorneys they were privileged, the court said:
However, there are no statutory provisions which provide
against the production of such reports or records or testimony con-
cerning them by the party, his non-attorney employees, or anyone
else. It is apparent, therefore, that this court extended the privilege
against testifying or producing evidence to an instance beyond
those supported by statutory or constitutional provisions.
Thus the court is in the position of holding that when the attorney-
client relationship is involved, the privilege is extended to persons, not
attorneys, assisting in the preparation for trial, although such persons
are not named in the statute, but that as concerns the physician-
patient relationship, the privilege against testifying is not extended to
them because they are not specifically named in the statute and that
as regards this particular relationship, the statute, being in derogation
of the common law, must be strictly construed.
It would seem that the court followed the proper and more rea-
sonable interpretation with respect to its holding on the attorney-
client relationship and rightfully extended the privilege to cover per-
sons assisting an attorney in preparation for trial and has statutory
justification for such a holding in that such a case "is plainly within
the reason and spirit of . . .Section 2317.02 of the Revised Code,
though not within the strict letter."36
On the other hand, if the Ohio Supreme Court, upon the re-
examination of the issues, were to reverse itself,37 and extend the
privilege to the entire hospital chart, and particularly the nurse's
notes, so long as the chart was prepared and kept under the super-
vision, and at the direction of a physician, it would be giving effect to
the very purpose of the statute, to-wit: grant the privilege against
testifying to the physician and all persons assisting him or collaborating
with him in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient whether in his
office, in a hospital or wherever such treatment might take place. In
this way the patient could be assured that he would be protected
against disclosure of his bodily ailments and that what is learned by
statements to a nurse in a hospital, the exhibition and examination of
his body in a hospital, the recording of his reactions to medication
and treatment, or the like, be sealed to the public and no part of the
hospital record testified to unless the patient himself should waive the
privilege.
35 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953).
36 Supra note 16.
37 Weis v. Weis, supra note 2.
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It may be true that an act of the legislature specifically contain-
ing such provisions would correct the situation but this seems un-
necessary when the Ohio Legislature has already given the courts
this authority, even to the extent of it being a directive when it en-
acted section 2317.0311 and stated that the principles (of privilege)
shall apply when a case is plainly within the reason and spirit of
section 2317.02, even if not within the strict letter.
38 Supra note 16.
